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COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION. By Carl H.
Fulda.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961. Pp. xii, 533. V0.00.
Professor Fulda has plunged into the thorniest thicket of the regulatory
process; he emerges, scratched but undaunted, with a useful and coherent ac-
count of what he finds there. In the transportation industries the reconciliation
of regulation with competitive norms is most difficult. Other utilities, notably
those with geographical monopolies like telephones, electricity, and gas, offer
little scope for rivalry of any sort. Except in special cases such as competition
between electricity, gas, and oil for domestic space heating use, we can achieve
only a pale simulation of competitive pricing by way of rate regulation.
In transportation, however, either the reality or the prospect of competition
is almost always present. There are, to be sure, patches of monopoly, as when
one railroad serves a coal-mining area, or one airline a small city with no
practical likelihood of another entrant. But in major markets railroads face
other railroads, sometimes water carriers too, and, ubiquitously, trucks. Air-
lines try to woo business from each other, and, without great success, to attract
more of the great mass of travellers who insist on driving vast distances in
their own cars.
Are the competitive forces pent up in these and other transportation rela-
tionships-both within modes of transport and between one mode and an-
other-to be fostered or repressed? If, taking immediately the side of the
angels and of Professor Fulda, one desires to foster competition, one imposes
on the regulatory agencies an ambivalent role. The historic task of the ICC, at
least until 1920 when it was first given the power to set minimum rates, Awas
to regulate monopoly behavior chiefly by restraining discrimination in rates
and service. This activity could be described as in aid of competition; but the
emphasis was rather on curbing monopolies which were still strong enough to
burden shippers, and to make predatory attacks on independent wrater carriers.
By 1935, when the ICC was given regulatory power over motor carriers,
there had been a change in its mission. In the circumstances of the great de-
pression, destructive competition among and between railroads and motor car-
riers was greatly feared. The ICC's task was now to "coordinate"-in this
setting a polite expression for restricting the full play of competition. In the
same period the Civil Aeronautics Board was also invested with. authority to
"coordinate" air transport. In 1940 inland water carriers were partially
brought under ICC jurisdiction, again in the name of "coordination" and
"stabilization."
The conventional tools of regulation, which in transportation have thus had
to be adapted to the control of competition as much as to the control of monop-
oly, are of three types. First are restrictions on entry and abandonment.
Second is control over combinations-either unifications within a particular
mode, for example railroad mergers, or acquisitions in other modes, for ex-
ample railroad purchases of motor carriers. Third is the regulation of rates,
*Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
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either directly or through supervision of collective rate-making by members
of the industry. When entry is either legally or economically restricted, control
over combinations becomes especially important in determining the shape of
the industry. This is notably true with respect to the railroads, where it is
practically out of the question that new lines will be built. Entry into trucking
and into aviation (I put aside inland water carriers as of little importance)
is economically more feasible but, given the present patterns of control, dif-
ficult. Therefore, Fulda properly pays close attention to control of unifications
-his inclusive term for any kind of acquisition or combination-and devotes
almost as much space to this regulatory tool as to the other two combined.
The structure of the book further emphasizes the importance that the author
attaches to policy about unifications. After a brief introductory description of
the overall pattern of regulation of the four modes with which he deals (rail-
ways, trucking, aviation, water carriers; there is also a brief chapter on freight
forwarders), he has separate chapters on the structural problems of each mode
and in these early chapters gives major attention to unifications. Only after
these matters of structure have been extensively considered does he turn to
rate regulation, and the operation of rate bureaus. Here he has a very useful
analysis of the operation of rate bureaus established by railroads and truckers
under the protective umbrella of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act. While he notes in-
stances of improper harassment, Fulda concludes that the structure and opera-
tion of these rate bureaus recognize a carrier's freedom of individual action, a
freedom which he finds is often used. He draws an instructive contrast be-
tween the rate-making process of the surface carriers, and the highly restric-
tive dual rate agreements prevalent in international shipping. The Federal
Maritime Board has been somewhat less than diligent in policing the cartel
agreements in this industry, and until the Supreme Court temporarily upset
the dual rate system in the Isbrandtsen case 1 independent ship operators were
often faced with these arrangements which, by offering lower rates for ex-
clusive patronage of conference lines, had a considerable coercive effect on
shippers. Fulda urges that participation by our shipping lines in international
rate agreements should be tolerated only if these agreements preserve some
freedom of independent action even by members of the cartel. This device,
however, seems inconsistent with the avowed anti-competitive intention of the
conferences. Congress rehabilitated the whole system, with only minor reforms,
in October, 1961.2
The rigid cartellization of international shipping is matched in the Inter-
national Air Transport Association. These international fields must of course
take into account the policies of other governments, especially in air transport,
where so many of the carriers are government-owned and subsidized. The
record of United States collaboration in maintaining high rate structures is
nevertheless depressing.
1. Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
2. 75 Stat. 762, 46 U.S.C. §§ 813-18 (1961 Supp.). See Gorman, Shipping Con! crences
and the Bonner Act, 1961,1962 J. Bus. LAW 24.
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Rate-making by the regulatory agencies themselves gets relatively brief at-
tention. Fulda seems eager to return to the e.xamination of policy with respect
to combinations, and devotes a major chapter to "Common Ownership of
Several Modes of Transportation", notably the elaborate, but uncertain, cri-
teria that the ICC applies to railroad acquisition or operation of motor carriers.
The book concludes with a crisp essay on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
in which Fulda joins with Professors Davis and Schwartz in deploring judi-
cial absention in cases where the applicability of antitrust policy seems to be
clear and agency competence to rule otherwise is doubtful. There is, finally, a
brief recapitulation of the author's fairly cautious proposals.
It is impossible within the scope of a review to comment on the detailed
analysis of hundreds of decisions of regulatory agencies, mostly from the ICC.
Professor Fulda deserves our sympathy and gratitude for having tried to ex-
plain and rationalize what Mr. Landis characterized, in criticising the ICC, as
"the poorest category of all administrative agency opinions."3 I, for one, will
cheerfully accept Fulda's explanation of what the ICC has been trying to say.
On the whole he is more tolerant than other critics of the Commission's per-
formance. After all, it is faced with an almost impossible task. On the one
hand, Congress calls for competition; on the other, not too much.
Consider the adjustment of inter-modal competition by means of rate cases.
The National Transportation Policy, as crystallized in the Transportation Act
of 1940, calls for "fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transporta-
tion subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economi-
cal, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transporta-
tion and among the several carriers .... ,,4 How does the Commission "preserve
the inherent advantages of each?" A persistent strain in the ICC's decisions
seems to convert "inherent advantages" into something like "fair shares." In
this view, even if the status quo can be altered, it must never be upset to the
extent of driving a carrier from a particular market if there would be some advan-
tage to shippers in keeping the service available (Is this advantage perhaps de-
termined simply by the fact that the carrier is there?). Since the National
Transportation Policy does direct the Commission to develop a "national trans-
portation system by water, highway, and rail," a protective role is perhaps un-
avoidable. "Both the Commission and the courts," Fulda observes, "in-
terpreted this as a command to afford equal opportunities to the various modes.
Accordingly, rate differentials are established to reflect the relative advantages
and disadvantages of each mode: Water transportation is generally inferior to
rails because of its slowness, and less costly, hence water rates may be expected
to be below rail rates; rail-water partity would drive all traffic to the rails.
Truck service may be preferable to rail service because of lower minimum
weight requirements or because it is faster and more flexible than, and there-
fore superior to, rail service, at least within certain distances; if so, rails must
3. LAls, REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PREsIDENT-ELEcT. (Dec.
1960) 39.
4. Quoted on p. 22.
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charge lower rates than trucks in order to be able to compete. The cost ad-
vantage of one mode over the other must be given full play, but the resulting
rate differentials must not be so great as to provoke rate wars or threaten the
disappearance of a competing mode." 5
Dissatisfaction, especially railroad dissatisfaction, with this policy led to a
1958 amendment to section 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Com-
mission, in examining allegedly unreasonable minimum rates, is now instructed
that "Rates of a carrier shall not be held up to a particular level to protect the
traffic of any other mode of transportation, giving due consideration to the
objectives of the national transportation policy. . . ."0 This is supposed to for-
bid "umbrella" rate-making. The author, who concentrates his discussion of
rate cases on the 1958 amendment and its consequences, does not think that
it has brought about any significant change.
He is more interested, as I have already suggested, in the structural prob-
lems affecting competition. Both in rates and in access to shippers, the most
deadly conflicts are between the railroad and trucking industries. Have the
trucks ruined the railroads? If so, is this progress? If the railroads were not
repressed by regulation, would they make one last violent sally and destroy
the trucks? Railway entry into trucking has been much constricted on the
supposition that the railroads would, if they could, destroy long-distance truck-
ing; the unsavory lobbying tactics recently disclosed in the Nocrr case 7 have
not helped to allay this view. Fulda concludes his analysis of the railway
diversification cases, after observing that the Commission is cautiously mov-
ing beyond approvals of merely auxiliary and supplemental truck service, by
suggesting that when railroads seek permission to acquire or operate truck
routes, the Commission should be concerned with rate economies, as well as
with the adequacy of existing service. "In other words, every case involving
common ownership of different modes could become a competitive rate-making
case, with opportunity for protestants to contest the validity of the rate pro-
posals. This may be a new way of fitting common ownership into the over-all
framework of competition."
While he is fairly probing and skeptical about restrictions on carriers moving
into other modes, Fulda is less resistant to trends toward increased concentration
within particular modes, notably railroads and airlines. Perhaps in this in-
stance he is accepting what many observers consider inevitable, unless there is
a major resurgence of antitrust spirit within the administration. In the case of
the airlines, he suggests that the Civil Aeronautics Board, in its almost un-
manageable task of allotting routes, has dealt too easily with the "Big Four"
(American, Eastern, T.W.A., United) as against the "Small Eight" trunk
lines and the irregular air carriers. Yet he recognizes the excess capacity that
has been created by jets, and concludes that, after all, a Big Four is "a pat-
5. Pp. 355-56.
6. P. 341.
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tern prevalent in many unregulated industries."9 He wrote before the proposed
American-Eastern merger, which would make the Big Four a Big Three.
With respect to the massive movement of proposed railroad mergers, Fulda
is not particularly critical about the claims made on their behalf, perhaps be-
cause he sees competition between railroads as decadent anyway. Trucking.
which provides the competitive spur to the railways, is still an industry of low
concentration. Fulda would keep it that way, with some tolerance for "end-to-
end" combinations where there is already considerable interchange of traffic
between the merging lines. He condemns the ICC's attempts to constrict entry
in trucking by extreme route and commodity restrictions which indeed con-
demn themselves. Congress, at the other extreme, has struck a notable blow
in keeping one segment of trucking free by the exemption from any economic
regulation of carriers of agricultural commodities. The commodities which
the ICC had found to fall within the agricultural exemption were codified in
1958. The list, like other matters that reflect group pressures within and close
to agriculture, defies rational explanation. Thus, Congress removed from the
ICC's list of exempted commodities frozen fruits and vegetables, but added fro-
zen or fresh cooked fish. Whether or not this catalog of agricultural exemptions
makes sense, Fulda supports the exemption simply because it creates competi-
tion. If it is inequitable in inter-modal competition, then the solution is to
extend it to the railroads (a suggestion also included in President Kennedy's
Transportation Policy message to Congress of April 5, 1962).
Another area of competition in trucking, or a major burden for the regu-
lated common carriers, depending on how you look at it, arises from the
recognition of contract motor carriers who have only limited service obliga-
tions, and the exemption of private motor carriage. There are obviously large
areas of private carriage that it would be foolish to attempt to regulate; but
there is also a great deal of erosion at the boundaries. The establishment of
these boundaries is another regulatory headache, giving rise to two divided
Supreme Court cases in the 1961 term.10 Fulda does not develop these prob-
lems, however.
These rapid references to large issues should not suggest that Fulda's work
is a superficial treatment of them. On the contrary, it has a solid underpinning
in careful and respectful analysis of the cases. There is also a realistic recogni-
tion that the cases do not concern pawns on a chessboard but often powerful
and aggressive business interests. Examples of this institutional feeling are
found in his treatment of inter-city bus transportation, where the cases are shot
through with the fact of Greyhound's dominance, and in the peculiar story
of the major household goods carriers, who for years defied both the ICC and
the Antitrust Division, ultimately accomplishing results that had been repeated-
ly declared illegal.
9. P. 256.
10. ICC v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U.S. 81 (1961) (contract carriage); United States
v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 (1962) (private carriage). See Note, National Transportation Policy
and the Regulation of Motor Carriers, 71 YAmxn L.J. 307 (1961).
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Still, in one major respect, Fulda's approach rests on an abstraction that, be-
cause it pervades the subject, should be subjected to especially skeptical criticism,
and is not. That is the notion that only the tightest of regulatory reins keeps
the industries in question from plunging headlong into the fires of "destruc-
tive competition." Thus, criteria for approving mergers modeled on Section 7
of the Clayton Act are considered not so much as a means of checking incipient
monopoly as of preventing situations in which some competitors may disappear.
Again, the discussions of rate-making are overshadowed by concern for pre-
venting rate wars of the sort that once prevailed among railroads in the nine-
teenth century and among truckers in the depression. Concededly, cutthroat rate
wars are possible. But are they likely to occur, given the oligopolistic nature of
what competition there is among railroads and air carriers and the increasing
stability of the trucking industry? It seems more to be feared that we will never
get enough price competition rather than that we will have too much.
The meaning of "destructive competition" and the possibility of its occurrence
are primarily matters for the economists to define and decide. It must be said
that recent economics writing is divided on the relevance of this ancient ap-
parition. There are other important economic issues where it is probably too
much to ask a lawyer writing on the legal framework to settle questions that
his colleagues in other disciplines cannot. Thus, permissiveness toward railway
and airline mergers is influenced by one's expectations about gains in efficiency
balanced against losses in competitiveness. Here also the economists are di-
vided; some argue that mergers of big carriers are not really cost-decreasing
at all. Finally, the difficult problems of inter-modal competition cannot begin
to be resolved without facing an issue which Fulda ignores--public aids to
transportation. If the trucks are ruining the railroads, is it because of their
inherent efficiency, or because they are subsidized by our highway system? To
the extent that inland waterways take away railroad traffic, is it because they
have inherent advantages or because they enjoy access to the most capacious of
legislative pork barrels? Here again the studies that attempt to deal with these
issues are divided (though I doubt there is much to be said for the inland
waterways) .11
In any event, Fulda does not undertake to encompass everything His open-
ing sentence is, "This book attempts to discover to what extent the principles
of the antitrust laws are being applied or not applied in industries subject to
federal regulation." He accordingly lights up only incidentally another ap-
proach to the total problem, the effectiveness of the administrative process in
the responsible federal agencies. Setting himself against the current exaltation
of procedural regularity as the highest good, he declares that until Congress
lays down dearer policy on specific competitive goals, "procedural improve-
ments would be no more than a palliative."'12
11. See Time, Oct. 12, 1962, pp. 26-27, for an account of the beginning of a project which
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That there is need for both procedural and substantive reform in national
transportation policy is widely recognized. The subject, though hardly head-
line-making in a time of chronic global crisis, has recently evoked a remark-
able official and academic output on the same theme as the work under re-
view.' 3 The general disposition of almost all the writers is toward more com-
petition in transportation. Fulda's similar predisposition and his measured
analysis of the legal setting combine to form a solid platform for other students
and for policy-makers.
RALPH S. BROWN, JR.t*
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION. By Leonard W. LEVY.* Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv, 353. $6.50.
THE doctrine of seditious libel derives from the English common law. It
maintains that the mere expression of critical opinions which disturb the pub-
lic repose by holding the government up to contumely constitutes a crime. By
definition, then, the doctrine is incompatible with the notion of a truly open
society, where presumably any citizen is free to express any opinion of the gov-
ernment, no matter how unpopular, as long as the expression does not immedi-
ately and directly result in an incitement to crime.
It has long been a school boy's copy book maxim, let alone a fundamental
postulate in the constitutional interpretation of the meaning of free speech, that
a major objective of the American Revolution and of the enactment of the First
Amendment was to repeal the English common law of seditious libel and install
in its stead freedom of speech and press. Judges, from Holmes to Brandeis to
Black and Douglas, and constitutional historians, from Madison to Schofield
13. Fulda has a thorough bibliography. I mention here only some of the items that have
appeared since his book went to press early in 1961: J. F. Kennedy, Message to Congress
on Transportation Policy, April 5, 1962, in N.Y. Times, April 6, 1962, p. 18; House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, Antitrust Subcommittee, The Ocean Freight Industry, H. P. REP.
No. 1419, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962); CAvEs, AiR TRANsPoRT AN. ITs RGuLTO.S
(1962) ; FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIv AGExcIES (1962) ; HEALY, THE EFFzcrs
OF SCALE IN THE RAmROAD INDusTRY (Yale Univ. Comm. on Transportation, 1961);
RICHmoND, REGuLATION AND CoaxI'zrrrroN iN AIR TRANsPoRTATioN (1961); Barber,
Airline Mergers, Monwpoly and the CAB, 28 J. Am L. 189 (1962) ; Prince, Railroads and
Government Policy-A Legally Oriented Study of an Economic Crisis, 48 VA. L RE. 196
(1962) ; Symposium, Antitrust and the Regulated and Exempt Industries, 19 A.B.A. Rep.
ANTITRUST SECTION PROCEEDINGS 261 (1961); Note, Merger and Monopoly in Domestic
Aviation, 62 CoLur_. L. REv. 851 (1962); Note, 71 YALE L.J. 307 (1961), note 10 mpro;
Comment, Restrictions on Entry of Surface Carriers Seeking to Fly, 71 YA.E LJ. 1529
(1962).
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